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In recent years commentators have criticized the American legal
system for its unresponsiveness to claims of self-defense by women
who have killed their abusers. Currently, battered woman syndrome
(BWS) is the most widely used mechanism to render battered
women's self-defense claims judicially cognizable.' However, some
feminist scholars criticize BWS both for diagnosing battered women'
who act in their own defense as mentally ill and for ignoring the actual
obstacles they face,3 while more conservative critics argue that BWS is
a special standard for women that cloaks ulterior motives.' The most
damaging criticism, however, is that it is statistically unclear whether
BWS has made a difference: while women are three times more likely
to be killed by an intimate than to kill an intimate themselves, and far
more likely to be acting in self-defense when they do, those women
still receive far harsher prison sentences than similarly situated men.
The ongoing debate over BWS has primarily focused on the tem-
poral factor of imminence. Although harm may not be imminent by
objective temporal measures, disagreement exists as to whether bat-
tered women's subjective perceptions of imminent harm can be
deemed reasonable.6 If disagreement about temporal imminence were
t B.A. 1998, Amherst College; J.D. 2004, The University of Chicago.
1 See Paris De Soto, Feminists Negotiate the Judicial Branch: Battered Woman's Syndrome,
in Cynthia R. Daniels, ed, Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics of Domestic Violence 53, 54
(University Press of America 1997).
2 The phrase "battered woman" is a generalization. However, women are almost seven
times more likely than men to be victims of serious domestic assault, and men are three times
more likely to kill their spouses or partners, making it both convenient and fairly accurate to re-
fer to the category of people that this Comment addresses as "battered women." See Kerry
Murphy Healey and Christine Smith, Batterer Programs: What Criminal Justice Agencies Need to
Know 2 (DOJ 1998).
3 See Kristin A. Kelly, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Privacy 70-74 (Cornell 2003).
4 See Donald Alexander Downs, More than Victims: Battered Women, the Syndrome Soci-
ety, and the Law 58, 146-47 (Chicago 1996) (claiming that BWS is a form of "advocacy science"
and too susceptible to "the problems associated with undue use of the psychology of victimiza-
tion"); George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial 21
(Free Press 1988) ("Retaliation, as opposed to defense, is a common problem in cases arising
from wife battering and domestic violence. The injured wife waits for the first possibility of strik-
ing against a distracted or unarmed husband. The man may even be asleep when the wife finally
reacts").
5 See note 60 and accompanying text.
6 This tension is captured by the majority and dissenting opinions in State v Hundley, 236
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truly at issue, however, one would expect "imminence" to be discussed
only in cases where there is no contemporaneous confrontation, mak-
ing the reasonableness of the perception of imminence a focal point.
A recent survey of self-defense cases found exactly the opposite. In
practice, imminence is, counterintuitively, more often an issue when
there is a contemporaneous confrontation, rather than when there is
not such a confrontation. Thus, "imminence" appears to be serving as a
covert proxy for factors other than temporality of threat. The impor-
tant project of identifying the factors for which imminence is actually
standing in has yet to be accomplished in the context of individual
self-defense law. However, an articulation of factors beyond immi-
nence that should be assessed has recently been undertaken in the in-
ternational law of self-defense.!
This Comment proposes that the same conceptual factors offered
to evaluate "imminence" at the international level should be applied
at the individual level. Historically, self-defense in the international
context has developed through analogy and reference to an individ-
ual's right of self-defense.9 Currently the standards for self-defense are
the same for individuals as for international entities: the danger must
be imminent, and the self-defensive force both necessary and propor-
tional. ° In both contexts, a strict requirement that a threat be tempo-
Kan 461, 693 P2d 475 (1985). During their ten-year marriage, Carl Hundley had knocked out
several of his wife Betty's teeth, "broken her nose at least five times, [ ] threatened to cut her
eyeballs out and her head off,. . . kicked [her] down the stairs on numerous occasions,... repeat-
edly broken her ribs," and sent her into diabetic comas by replacing her insulin with water, all of
which entailed police involvement and hospitalization on multiple occasions. Id at 475-76. Betty
finally fled to a motel, where Carl broke into her room, physically and sexually brutalized her,
and then told her to get him some cigarettes. Betty pulled her gun out of her purse and de-
manded Carl leave; Carl told her, "You are dead, bitch, now!" and reached for a beer bottle.
Betty shot him. Id at 476. The majority opinion held that "[t]he objective test is how a reasonably
prudent battered wife" would perceive an imminent threat. Id at 479. The dissent disagreed, fail-
ing to see anything objectively reasonable about Betty's perception of imminence since, had
she left the hotel room, she "would have had a five minute head start." Id at 481 (MacFarland
dissenting).
7 See V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U Chi L Rev 1235, 1239 (2001) ("[I]f
there is a problem with the law of criminal defenses today, it is not with syndromes or subjectiv-
ity, but with a criminal law that purports to be neutral and precise but remains full of contested
meanings.").
8 See, for example, John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729, 751-61 (2004); John Yoo,
International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 Am J Intl L 563,575 (2003).
9 See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 160 (Cambridge 3d ed 2001)
("The legal notion of self-defence has its roots in interpersonal relations, and has been sanctified
in domestic legal systems since time immemorial. From the dawn of international law, writers
sought to apply this concept to inter-State relations.").
10 Compare Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might: Inter-
national Law and the Use of Force 37,45 (Council on Foreign Relations 2d ed 1991) ("[T]he right
to self-defense . . . is subject to limitations of 'necessity' and 'proportionality,' but that self-
defense includes a right both to repel the armed attack and to take the war to the aggressor state
in order effectively to terminate the attack and prevent recurrence."), with Black's Law Diction-
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rally "imminent" renders illegal any action taken in preemptive, or an-
ticipatory, self-defense." With the Bush administration's adoption of a
new policy of preemptive self-defense,'2 the three factors (beyond
temporality) that have been articulated as defining imminence are
probability, availability of alternative recourses, and magnitude of
harm.'3 In keeping with the traditionally analogous relationship be-
tween the international and domestic concepts, these factors should be
relevant to individual self-defense as well.
Applying these factors in the individual context would address
many of the concerns regarding BWS. First, it would identify the ele-
ments that are already implicitly assessed by "imminence" and assign
them their appropriate legal weight-rather than leaving it to the un-
articulated prejudices of judges and juries. Second, relocating battered
women's actions as part of a legally recognized experience, rather than
as mental illness, would address both feminist criticisms and conserva-
tive concerns by replacing an amorphous syndrome with more acces-
sible, and objective, factors. Third, the use of these objective factors
may enable a greater number of battered women who kill their abus-
ers to receive self-defense jury instructions and have their actions
deemed justifiable self-defense.
A brief survey of the international and individual contexts sug-
gests the desirability of employing the self-defense factors proposed in
the international arena in the domestic law of self-defense. Thus, Part I
will sketch the development and current doctrine of self-defense in
the individual context before focusing on the specific challenges posed
by the experiences of battered women to the current requirement of
imminence. Part II will trace the parallel development of self-defense
doctrine at the international level before outlining the specific doc-
trinal challenges posed by new threats. Part III will compare the inter-
national and domestic theories of self-defense, and argue that the ad-
ary 1390 (West 8th ed 2004) ("[A] person is justified in using a reasonable amount of force in
self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that the danger of bodily harm is imminent and that
force is necessary to avoid this danger.").
11 See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U Pitt
L Rev 553, 557 (1996) ("Preemptive strikes are illegal in international law as they are illegal in-
ternally in every legal system of the world.").
12 See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 25 (2002), online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (visited Aug 23, 2004) ("We must adapt the concept of
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. ... To forestall or pre-
vent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.").
13 See Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 575 (cited in note 8); Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 755 (cited in
note 8). Although Yoo describes the factors as "expand[ing] the concept of imminence," 71 U
Chi L Rev at 755, it is more accurate to describe them as being in addition to imminence. Immi-
nence is a temporal concept; this Comment posits that the temporal proximity of a threat may
not be the only reliable measurement of necessity, and thus that additional factors are required
for judging the necessity of defending against a threat.
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ditional factors beyond temporal imminence offered in the interna-
tional arena to delineate an appropriate definition of preemptive self-
defense -probability, alternative recourses, and magnitude of harm-
can sensibly be imported to domestic self-defense law. Finally, Part IV
will apply these factors to a paradigmatic, controversial case of a bat-
tered woman who killed her sleeping abuser and was subsequently
denied a self-defense jury instruction." Even in this very difficult case,
where traditionally strict temporal imminence is lacking, evaluating
the additional factors-probability of harm posed by the abuser, lack
of alternative recourses, and magnitude of harm-can recast the de-
fendant's actions as legally justifiable anticipatory self-defense.
I. INDIVIDUAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
The traditionally strict requirement of imminence in self-defense
law has come under scrutiny in light of battered women's experiences.
The early development of self-defense law was formulated to address
specific, potentially fatal, confrontations, none of which included
threats faced in long-term violent relationships. This conceptual gap
does not require that imminence be discarded as a measurement of
necessary self-defensive force; it does, however, suggest that a lack of
strict temporal imminence should not be fatal to a self-defense claim.
To demonstrate the desirability of including considerations beyond
temporal imminence, it is first necessary to describe self-defense law's
early development, outline subsequent arguments for change in the
context of domestic violence, and highlight the ways in which BWS
has failed to overcome the obstacles posed by traditional self-defense
law.
A. Traditional Individual Self-Defense Law
Grounded in natural law," the modern right of self-defense in
Anglo-American law became firmly entrenched in early England.
6
14 See State v Norman, 324 NC 253,378 SE2d 8 (1989).
15 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q 96, Art 6 (Benziger 1947) ("If [ the
peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the
mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law."). Hobbes and Locke
further enshrined this "conception of a natural right to self-defense," maintaining that "the very
purpose of civil society is to institutionalize the natural right of individuals to secure their protec-
tion from others." Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence and Guided Discretion in the Supreme
Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 Am Crim L Rev 1151,1155 n 22 (2003).
16 See, for example, William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England *4 (Chi-
cago 1979):
Self-defence therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can
it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.... [B]ut care must be taken, that the resis-
tance does not exceed the bounds of mere defence and prevention; for then the defender
would himself become an aggressor.
[71:17491752
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The law of self-defense for individuals developed around two scenar-
ios: either an individual is feloniously attacked by another, in what
could be called the "stranger in a dark alley" scenario, or an individual
becomes involved in a "chance-medley," in what could be called the
"bar fight" scenario." In both cases either the attack by the stranger or
the fact of mutual combat authorized the person acting in self-defense
to respond to the extent that he felt he was in "imminent" danger, so
long as he only deployed force that was necessary and proportionate
to the attack.'
Women's experiences with domestic violence were simply not en-
visioned when the legal criteria for self-defense were developed.'9
Rather, the doctrine of coverture allowed husbands to discipline their
wives physically,'° and women were specifically forbidden to defend
themselves against such abuse.2' As Blackstone memorably described
the law:
[I]f the baron kills his feme it is the same as if he had killed a
stranger, or any other person; but if the feme kills her baron, it is
regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime, as she not
only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal af-
fection, but throws off all subjection to the authority of her hus-
band. And therefore the law denominates her crime a species of
treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had
killed the king. And for every species of treason ... the sentence
of women was to be drawn and burnt alive.?
17 Id at *183-84 (noting that there are two main "species of self-defense": self-defense
"calculated to hinder the perpetration of a capital crime" and self-defense "whereby a man may
protect himself from an assault ... in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel").
18 See text accompanying note 10.
19 Clearly, neither of the traditional scenarios contemplates the two combatants leaving the
bar fight or robbery in an alley and going home to raise children together. See Cynthia K. Gilles-
pie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense and the Law 4-8, 38 (Ohio State 1989)(arguing that the law of self-defense was developed with men in mind and does not take into ac-
count the physical and other differences between men and women).
20 See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
Yale L J 2117,2121-30 (1996) (detailing the common law doctrine of coverture, which legally en-
titled a man to physically chastise his wife). See also Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be
Abolished, 18 Women's Rts L Rep 283,294 (1997) (discussing, in addition to coverture, the legal
parallels between marriage and slavery).
21 See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *75 (Chicago 1979):
[T]reason ... denote[s] ... that accumulation of guilt which arises whenever an inferior...
so forgets the obligations of duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy the life of [ I his
superior or lord.... [T]herefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband ... being [a] breach]
of the lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, [is] denominated petit treason[.
22 William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *418 n 103 (Welsh & Co 1898), quoted in Eliza-beth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U Pitt L Rev 477,484 n 21 (1996). A Virginia judge
explained, "Other offences are injurious to Private Persons only, but this is a Public Mischief and
often strikes at the Root of all Civil Government." Hugh F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in
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Although the doctrines of coverture and petit treason eventually
fell into disuse, the law not only disregarded women's need to protect
themselves in their own homes but also helped to create the condi-
tions from which they would need protection.2
The women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and its "discov-
ery" of domestic violence,4 challenged self-defense law's nonrespon-
siveness to the situation in which women were most likely to confront
violence. 2 If a battered woman acted in self-defense during a "lull" in a
pattern of ongoing violence, and thus was seen as not facing an immi-
nent threat, the jury was prohibited from receiving self-defense in-
structions. This approach excluded from consideration all history of
abuse.26 Even when evidence of past abuse was admitted at trial, juries
and judges tended to view the requirements of "duty to retreat" and
"imminence" as an invitation to ask what steps the woman could have
taken to leave the relationship prior to the fatal encounter.
2
1 This ap-
the General Court of Colonial Virginia 222 (Williamsburg 1965), cited in Ann Jones, Women Who
Kill 36 (Beacon 1996). The last reported case of a woman killing her husband and being burned
at the stake in the United States was in 1731. See Jones, Women Who Kill at 36.
23 "[B]attering of women by husbands, ex-husbands, and lovers remains the single largest
cause of injury to women in the United States today," and "[f]emale homicide victims [are] more
than nine times more likely to have been killed by a husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend than
male homicide victims [are] to have been killed by their wife, ex-wife, or girlfriend." Siegel, 105
Yale L J at 2171-72 (cited in note 20) (internal citations omitted). Estimates by the Journal of
the American Medical Association place the number of women "believed to be battered every
year by their partners [at] approximately four million." Id at 2173.
24 The first children's shelters were founded at the turn of the twentieth century and based
on the model of animal shelters; in contrast, the first U.S. battered women's shelter opened in
St. Paul, Minnesota in 1974. See Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy
against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present 40-60 (Oxford 1987). The U.S. still has
three times as many animal shelters as battered women's shelters. Staff of Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong, 2d Sess, Violence against Women: A Week in the Life of America 26
(GPO 1992).
25 The groundwork for these legal challenges was laid in earlier cases that addressed
women's experiences with self-defense law but did not involve abusive relationships. For exam-
ple, State v Wanrow, 88 Wash 2d 221, 559 P2d 548 (1977), recognized that the concept of "propor-
tional" force must take into account the strength differential that might exist in an encounter be-
tween a woman and a man.
26 See, for example, State v Norman, 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 13 (1989) (denying a self-
defense instruction when a battered woman was not faced with the "instantaneous choice be-
tween killing her husband or being killed or seriously injured"); People v Aris, 215 Cal App 3d
1178,264 Cal Rptr 167 (1989) (finding that a battered woman did not face immediate peril when
she shot her sleeping husband); State v Gallegos, 104 NM 247, 719 P2d 1268 (1986) (denying a
self-defense instruction because a battered woman's husband lying on a bed presented no imme-
diate threat); State v Allery, 101 Wash 2d 591,682 P2d 312 (1984) (denying a self-defense instruc-
tion because a battered woman's husband lying on a couch presented no immediate threat).
27 This was true even for the majority of states without the duty-to-retreat rule. Thus, re-
gardless of how dangerous the situation faced by the battered woman at the moment of confron-
tation, the rationale was that she would have left the relationship a long time earlier if she had
really feared death. See, for example, Commonwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949 (1981)
(describing, and reversing, a trial court's decision that a woman who was being choked by her
husband at the time of the shooting was not in imminent danger because past abuse had not in-
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proach conflicts with "traditional" self-defense law, where one does
not forfeit the right to self-defense by failing to avoid a known threat.-
Yet the "requirements of immediate danger, necessary force, reason-
able belief and the duty to retreat present[ed] almost insurmountable
barriers to a self-defense claim in the wife-battery situation."29
Feminists' initial response to the failure of judges and legislatures
to recognize battered women's actions as self-defense was to fight for
the recognition of battered woman syndrome. Pioneered by psycholo-
gist Lenore Walker, ° BWS, a subspecies of posttraumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD), was designed to address the gap between society's stereo-
types and battered women's experiences. Judges and juries tended to
interpret a woman's decision to stay in an abusive relationship as an
indication that she was not afraid for her life, or that she invited the
abuse. BWS provided an alternative explanation. Walker explained
that through a "cycle of violence,"3' a woman came to believe herself
powerless to leave the relationship, a condition known as "learned
helplessness."" A woman stayed in the relationship not because she
was masochistic, or because the violence was not terrifying, but be-
cause she was psychologically trapped."
Expert testimony on the syndrome was first accepted in Ibn-
Tamas v United States,' where the court explained that BWS would be
useful in assessing a battered woman's claim of self-defense." By the
mid-1990s, expert testimony on BWS had been accepted in some form,
volved potentially deadly force and because her husband had no weapon at the time of the
shooting). Watson is discussed at length in Nourse, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1246-48 (cited in note 7).
28 See, for example, State v Bristol, 53 Wyo 304,84 P2d 757,765 (1938) (holding that the de-
fendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary, who had threatened to
attack him, was drinking).
29 Nanci Koser Wilson, Gendered Interaction in Criminal Homicide, in Anna Victoria Wil-
son, ed, Homicide: The Victim/Offender Connection 43,50 (Anderson 1993).
30 Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman (Harper 1979). See also Lenore E. Walker, The
Battered Woman Syndrome (Springer 1984); Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome
and Self-Defense, 6 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Policy 321 (1992).
31 Three phases constitute this "cycle": (1) the "tension building" phase, (2) an "acute bat-
tering incident," and (3) a "loving contrition" stage. Walker, 6 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub
Policy at 330 (cited in note 30).
32 Id at 330-32. Famously, this condition was based on a series of experiments that Martin
Seligman conducted on dogs. When caged dogs were repeatedly subjected to electric shocks, at
some point they stopped trying to escape from the cage, lay down, and passively accepted the
electrical shocks. Martin E.P. Seligman, et al, Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J
Abnormal Psychology 256 (1968); Martin E.R Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Develop-
ment, and Death (W.H. Freeman 1975).
33 See Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts L Rep 195, 211 (1986) ("A battered
woman who has been the victim of abuse for many years and has survived it before must credi-
bly explain why it was necessary to act on that occasion."); Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women
& Feminist Lawmaking 117,135 (Yale 2000).
34 407 A2d 626 (DCApp 1979).
35 Id at 635.
1756 The University of Chicago Law Review [71:1749
whether through precedent or statute, in all fifty states.6 Thus, if an
expert witness testifies that a woman who killed her abuser was suffer-
ing from BWS, and a judge accepts that finding, the self-defense in-
structions and evidence of abuse that might otherwise have been ex-
cluded are allowed into the trial.37 This testimony was seen as having
the further benefit of challenging the biases that the jury or judge
might have against victims of domestic violence.3
B. Criticism of Battered Woman Syndrome
Although BWS seemed to solve the evidentiary and jury instruc-
tion problems,39 some of its strongest critics have been feminists, who
point to both pragmatic and theoretical concerns.* First, there are
practical problems with BWS. Although it is logical that those in long-
term, physically violent relationships might suffer from a form of
PTSD," the extension of PTSD to a theory of "learned helplessness" is
less certain.42 Furthermore, creating an identity category into which
women must fit in order to claim BWS presents its own problems.
Certain kinds of women look more "helpless" than others, and those
who find themselves less likely to fit into the category tend to be non-
36 See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 Wis Women's L J 75 (1996).
37 For example, in State v Kelly, the court explained that BWS evidence may "aid the jury
in understanding the reasonableness of [the defendant's] apprehension of imminent death or
bodily injury ... [and] is offered to aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence and deter-
mining a fact in issue." 102 Wash 2d 188,685 P2d 564,570 (1984).
38 Id. See also State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63,716 P2d 563,567 (1986):
[BWS helps to] dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering re-
lationship is free to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any "common
sense" conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would
have left her husband much earlier.
39 It should be noted that a judicial finding that a defendant suffers from BWS does not
amount to a "battered woman's defense." BWS simply allows the defendant's jury to receive in-
structions on self-defense, which does not guarantee that the jury will so find. See, for example,
People v Saiz, 923 P2d 197 (Colo App 1995) (allowing a self-defense instruction, which the jury
rejected).
40 See, for example, Schneider, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking at 123 (cited in
note 33) ("The use of the term 'battered woman syndrome' has intensified the general confusion
about domestic violence and battered women, and has increased the likelihood that the law will be
misapplied to battered women when they seek protection in the courts or appear as defendants.").
41 This Comment does not claim that women who are in abusive relationships are not men-
tally harmed by that experience. Rather, it claims that the mental harm need not entail a finding
of mental illness that impairs a woman's ability to accurately assess life-threatening situations.
42 For examples of the challenges to the scientific validity of BWS, see Marilyn McMahon,
Battered Women and Bad Science: The Limited Validity and Utility of Battered Woman Syndrome,
6 Psychiatry, Psychology, & L 23 (1999); Robert F Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis, and Megan Sulli-
van, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction between Justification and
Excuse, 1994 U Ill L Rev 45.
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white women, 3 working women, lesbiansj and, perhaps most prob-
lematic, those who had tried to leave their relationships but eventually
killed their abusers.'
Second, feminists pointed out that BWS reinforced the familiar
tendency to pathologize women's behavior, minimizing what seemed
to be the real issues. Obstacles to leaving a violent relationship, be-
yond a woman's mental state, include economic, social, religious, fa-
milial, and legal barriers.4' Furthermore, those obstacles do not include
the now widely documented risk that women are most likely to be
killed by their abusers when they attempt to leave the relationship4-
43 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception ofReasonableness, 81 Minn L Rev 367 (1996) (discussing how racial stereotypes about African-
Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos influence jurors in self-defense cases); Jody D. Ar-
mour, Race lpsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negro-
phobes, 46 Stan L Rev 781 (1994) (outlining how African-Americans tend to be stereotyped as
aggressive, which, in the BWS context, hinders a diagnosis of "helplessness").
44 See Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, Difference, and Intralesbian Vio-lence, in Martha Albertson Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds, The Public Nature of Private
Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse 195 (Routledge 1994) (profiling intralesbian violence
within the context of feminist theory).
45 This has been called the "victimization-agency dichotomy," and it poses the following
bind:
A battered woman supposedly cannot be victimized if she has acted in any way that sug-
gests agency or if she is a survivor; in contrast, if she is a victim, she cannot be considered
reasonable.... But women who are battered, and particularly battered women who kill, are
simultaneously victims and agents: they are abused but they also act to protect themselves.
Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking at 120 (cited in note 33). Thus, the theory
of learned helplessness flies in the face of a woman's actual efforts to survive the relationship.
Only a small percentage of the cases where women have ended up killing their abusers actually
occurred in a "nonconfrontational" setting. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-
Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U Pa L Rev 379, 397(1991). In one study, four out of five victims of intimate offender violence attempted to resist the
assault; either they passively resisted by trying to get help, threatening, arguing, or using evasive
action, or-half as often-they actively resisted, using a weapon or fighting back. Caroline Wolf
Harlow, Female Victims of Violent Crime 6 (DOJ 1991). It has been pointed out that if "learned
helplessness" were taken to its logical conclusion, battered women who hire third parties to kill
their abusers would present the strongest case for BWS. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The GenderQuestion in Criminal Law, 7 Soc Phil & Policy 105,119-20 (Spring 1990). This scenario has never
been accepted by a court as self-defense. See, for example, People v Yaklich, 833 P2d 758 (Colo
App 1991).
46 See, for example, Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal L Rev 1 (1994); Schnei-
der, 9 Women's Rts L Rep at 220 (cited in note 33).
47 For example, fears of economic repercussions are well founded, as illustrated by the fact
that almost 50 percent of homeless women and children are refugees from domestic violence.
Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J L & Policy 237, 244-45 (1994)(noting that approximately 31 percent of battered women housed in New York City shelters re-
turned to their batterers "primarily because they could not locate longer-term housing"). See
also Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 Clearinghouse Rev 420,
421 (1991).
48 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Sepa-
ration, 90 Mich L Rev 1, 6-7 (1991) (defining "separation assault" as the increased risk of vio-
lence when a woman attempts to leave an abusive relationship).
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restraining orders notwithstanding. Many critics concluded that focus-
ing on battered women's mental health, and requiring them to hide in
shelters, change identities, move states, and live like fugitives has
not only missed the fundamental problem of domestic violence but
also created new unforeseen legal obstacles for battered women in ar-
eas such as child custody, employment, welfare, immigration, and
housing. 9
Battered woman syndrome was also challenged from a more con-
servative perspective, with critics heralding its acceptance as "an open
season on men" and the deterioration of our system of objective jus-
tice."' Underlying this criticism was the suspicion that BWS masks ul-
terior, illegal motives such as retaliation, cloaking them in the respect-
able claim of self-defense." They also charged that BWS created a
"special" standard for women2 that would generate further "special"
standards for other interest groups." This criticism has focused on the
concept of "reasonableness" and whether battered women's actions
should be judged under a subjective "reasonable battered woman"
standard or under an objective "reasonable person" standard. ' This
debate, although of questionable utility," was predictable given that
battered women's right to self-defense had been pinned on the notion
that they were suffering from a mental illness, making it difficult to
classify their acts as "reasonable.
' 6
49 See Kelly, Domestic Violence at 74-77 (cited in note 3); Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for
Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 Wash U J L & Policy 157, 169-90 (2003) (outlining the
difficulties that a diagnosis of BWS can entail, including adverse custody decisions, being denied
insurance, and welfare and immigration consequences).
50 See Loraine P Eber, Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
Hastings L J 895, 930 & n 190 (1981) (citing various commentators' predictions that a battered
woman's defense would lead to an "open season on men").
51 See note 4.
52 It has been argued that the existence of this special standard is harmful in that it conde-
scendingly treats battered women as victims. See Downs, More than Victims at 3-4 (cited in note
4) (finding that once syndrome status has been achieved, no lines are drawn between justified
and unjustified acts); Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of
Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 Loyola L Rev 81, 83 (2001) ("Not only do juries refuse to
buy the story battered woman syndrome presents, but they cast women in a demeaning light, a
light that does not reflect reality.").
53 See, for example, Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Ou Sob Sto-
ries and Evasions of Responsibility (Little, Brown 1994); Joelle Anne Moreno, Killing Daddy:
Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused Child, 137 U Pa L Rev 1281 (1989).
54 See Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking at 138-39 (cited in note 33)
("The objective standard-the traditional 'reasonable-man standard'-looked at reasonableness
from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable man, while the subjective standard regarded
reasonableness from the individual's own perspective."). See also Sanford H. Kadish and
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 770-73 (Aspen 7th ed 2001).
55 See Nourse, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1299 (cited in note 7) ("The discourse of subjectivity and
objectivity says most not about the law of self-defense or any other rule of criminal law, but
about the politics of criminal law scholarship.").
56 See Charles Patrick Ewing, Battered Women Who KilL" Psychological Self-Defense as Legal
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Perhaps the most devastating critique of BWS, however, comes
from objective evaluations of its actual impact on the legal system. Af-
ter thirty years, BWS's greatest contribution has arguably been its
function of raising awareness of domestic violence issues. However,
this increased awareness has not resulted in a meaningful reduction in
the rate at which women are killed by their partners," nor has it made
the legal system any more responsive to the self-defense claims of bat-
tered women." The primary situation in which women might need to
kill in self-defense is during a confrontation with an intimate, as
women are "more likely to be killed by an intimate partner than by a
total of all other categories of assailants," and are three times more
likely to be killed by an intimate than to kill an intimate themselves."
However, not only do women who commit homicide "generally re-
ceive longer sentences than men who kill," but "[b]attered women
who kill tend to receive even longer sentences" than nonbattered
women, with one survey showing that 83.7 percent of battered women
"received sentences ranging from twenty-five years to life."" Com-
bined with the fact that "only a small percentage of women accused of
killing their batterers are acquitted at trial"-with between 72 and 80
Justification 46-50 (Lexington 1987). This debate did, however, finally produce the step of se-
mantic progress that recently changed the wording of self-defense laws around the country from
"reasonable man" to "reasonable person."
57 See Elizabeth Leonard, Convicted Survivors: The Imprisonment of Battered Women 8
(SUNY 2002) (noting that the number of women killed by intimates was stable between 1976
and 1993, down 23 percent between 1993 and 1997, and up 8 percent the following year).
58 See note 60 and accompanying text.
59 This holds true for nonlethal attacks as well; on average, there are "more than 960,000
violent victimizations of women age 12 and older by an intimate" each year that are serious
enough to be reported to law enforcement or for hospital treatment to be sought. Lawrence A.
Greenfield, et al, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former
Spouses, Boyfriends; and Girlfriends (DOJ 1998), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/vi.pdf (visited Aug 23, 2004). The National Organization for Women estimates the number at
over 2 million. Donna Hazley, Women's Prison Population Growing, National NOW Times
(Summer 2001), online at http://www.now.org/nnt/summer-2001/prisons.htn-l (visited Aug 23,
2004).
60 Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking at 280-81 nn 114-15 (cited in note
33). These statistics are not just based on women who simply allege that the man they killed
abused them. In one women's prison, for example, 40 percent of inmates incarcerated for murder
or manslaughter had killed a partner who repeatedly assaulted them; and these women had
sought police protection at least five times before resorting to homicide. WAC STATS: The Facts
about Women 57 (Women's Action Coalition 1992), citing statistics from the National Commis-
sion for Jail Reform. In localities where shelters and services have been made available to bat-
tered women, however, the number of men killed by women has declined markedly. See
Greenfield, et al, Violence by Intimates at v (cited in note 59) ("The percentage of female murder
victims killed by intimates has remained at about 30% since 1976. There has been a sharp de-
crease in the rate of intimate murder of men."). Sue Ostoff, the cofounder of the National Clear-
inghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, observed: "I went into this work to help women....
Now it seems like we've all been working very hard all these years to save the lives of men.
That's not what I had in mind." Jones, Women Who Kill at 347 (cited in note 22).
61 Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking at 280-81 nn 114-15.
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percent taking a plea bargain or being convicted-the result is that the
vast majority of women who are in prison for first- or second-degree
murder are incarcerated for killing an abusive partner.6' For all practi-
cal purposes, one of the only real threats of murder faced by women,
and thus one of the only situations in which women kill in self-defense,
is not accommodated by the current standard of self-defense, BWS
notwithstanding.
C. Reassessment of Imminence
After several decades of debate on theoretical aspects of self-
defense such as subjective versus objective reasonableness, imminence
versus immediacy, and justification versus excuse, the requirement of
imminence has finally been subjected to more rigorous analysis. Im-
portantly, commentators have recognized that "imminence" is a politi-
cal term,6' rather than a moral argument about the justification of
force, which is more accurately captured by the requirement of "ne-
cessity."65 Imminence is therefore a political judgment that the tempo-
rality of the threat is the best indicator of whether self-defensive force
is necessary.
If courts interpreted imminence to mean only a threat that was
temporally proximate, there should be little to no discussion of the de-
fendant's perception of imminence in cases where there is a contem-
poraneous confrontation. During a confrontation, the threat is-by
definition -temporally imminent. However, a recent comprehensive
survey of self-defense cases over the last twenty years found that,
counterintuitively, the "vast majority of imminence-relevant cases"
were solidly confrontational and did not deal with imminence as a
62 Leonard, Convicted Survivors at 37-38 (cited in note 57).
63 There seems to be resignation on this point by many who concede that BWS has not
been successful but that it is better than reverting to completely ignoring battered women's ex-
periences in self-defense cases. See, for example, De Soto, Feminists Negotiate the Judicial Branch
at 64 (cited in note 1) ("Until legal definitions are expanded to correspond to the realities of
both men and women, however, using BWS as a defense is probably a battered woman's best
bet.").
64 See, for example, Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 570 (cited in note 11):
The requirement [of imminence] properly falls into the domain of political rather than
moral theory. The issue is the proper allocation of authority between the state and the citi-
zen. When the requirement is not met, when individuals engage in preemptive attacks
against suspected future aggressors, we fault them on political grounds. They exceed their
authority as citizens; they take "the law into their own hands." Precisely because the issue is
political rather than moral, the requirement must be both objective and public. There must
be a signal to the community that this is an incident in which the law ceases to protect, that
the individual must secure his or her own safety.
65 See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batter-
ers, 71 NC L Rev 371,380 (1993) (stating that "imminence has no significance independent of the
notion of necessity" -it is only a "translator of the underlying principle of necessity").
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temporal concept at all." Rather, the case law showed that "immi-
nence has many meanings" and was far more frequently operating "as
a proxy for any number of other self-defense factors-for example,
strength of threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression."67 This phe-
nomenon was especially noticeable in battered women's cases where,
although the opinions extensively discussed imminence, "almost three
quarters ... raised confrontational claims."'
The observation that values other than temporality are often im-
ported through the concept of imminence is not unique to battered
woman cases. The value judgments covertly made in battered woman
cases are also made in mutual combat "bar fight" cases in which tem-
porality should similarly be a nonissue because of the contemporane-
ous confrontation. With the element of temporality met, the immi-
nence inquiry enables the factfinder to allocate blame by determining
an "initial aggressor" or imposing a "pre-retreat" rule. However, in
both cases the inquiry is inappropriate: no jurisdictions require "pre-
retreat" to avoid a confrontation. The common law of self-defense
protects "the freedom to move."6'9 Furthermore, even in these two
situations, "[i]t is one thing for jurors or judges to confuse imminence





If imminence in practice serves "as a proxy for other self-defense
factors-questions of motive and emotion and retreat, 71 it is neces-
sary to address those factors, and the underlying value judgments, di-
rectly. If jury instructions and statutes articulated the specific factors
that we actually accept in practice as defining "necessary" self-defense,
they would allow self-defensive actions that look more anticipatory,
66 Nourse, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1253 (cited in note 7).
67 Id at 1236.
68 Id at 1253. Not surprisingly, "battering claims ... heavily dominated the small noncon-
frontational universe." Id at 1254.
69 Id at 1284 & n 237 (noting that a "pre-retreat rule ... has never been a part of standard
self-defense law"), citing Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 119 (Clarendon 1992).
Nourse further points out that the "man who goes for the fiftieth time to the violent gang-bar is
not deprived of his self-defense claim because he 'should have left' before the violence erupted."
68 U Chi L Rev at 1284. In the battered woman context, very few scholars have urged "that we
should ask of women why they did not leave," with some notable exceptions. Id. See Schulhofer,
7 Soc Phil & Policy at 128-29 (cited in note 45) ("[W]e cannot forgo all punishment if the cir-
cumstances afforded the [abused] woman some alternative.... Conviction and some punishment
remain appropriate so long as the social and economic cirumstances... did afford some reason-
able alternative to the use of deadly force.").
70 Nourse, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1284.
71 Id at 1267 (suggesting that "scholars of self-defense should be worried not only that im-
minence is sloppy but also that ... despite the conventional wisdom that the elements of self-
defense are well-established and coherent, in fact the law of imminence reflects deep conflicts in
the law of self-defense").
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but retain the requisite level of necessity." In the international arena
there has been an effort to undertake just such a project, outlining the
factors that should define self-defense, when temporal imminence
alone is insufficient to ascertain necessity.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of what role,
if any, anticipatory self-defense should play at the international level.
To adequately assess the factors that have been proposed to relax the
traditionally strict requirement of temporal imminence in the interna-
tional arena, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of traditional
self-defense law, as codified by the United Nations Charter, before
addressing the arguments advanced for a modification in the law to
accommodate changed circumstances.
A. Traditional International Self-Defense Law
Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, the concept of jus ad
bellum-or a just use of force or recourse to war-had developed over
several thousand years.73 World War I brought the inadequacies of ex-
isting international dispute mechanisms into dramatic relief, and the
resulting League of Nations and Kellogg-Briand Pact were unable to
prevent World War II.74 However, "the idea of prohibiting aggressive
war," with exceptions only for "self-defense and wars authorized by
the League of Nations," had been "indelibly planted in the minds of
modern world leaders."75 Against this backdrop, the UN Charter be-
came the central route for the resort to force.
72 This does not mean that "temporality" is irrelevant; it is clearly a strong indicator of ne-
cessity. However, if "temporality" and "imminence" are not treated synonymously in practice,
then what is actually being captured by "imminence" should be clearly spelled out.
73 Early Greek philosophers, natural law theorists such as Aquinas, and secular theorists of
just war such as Grotius developed this concept through analogy and reference to an individual's
right to self-defense. See, for example, Aristotle, The Politics 319 (Chicago 1984) (Carnes Lord,
trans); Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius 21-29, 172-80, 195-230 (Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge 1965). In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia codified principles of
state sovereignty that, although allowing that all states had a competence de guerre (or right to
"institute a war at any time to vindicate their rights"), also provided for the important develop-
ment of a positivist system of international law through an ever-increasing structure of treaties
and dispute resolution mechanisms. Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law
and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm 15, 17 (Routledge 1993). Thus, prior to
World War I, the legal right of states to redress injuries through reprisal had been established in
an arbitral decision involving Germany and Portugal, while the legal requirements for self-
defense were enumerated in official correspondence between England and the United States.
See Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law § 4 at 148, 149 (GPO 1971) (discussing
the Naulilaa case); John Bassett Moore, 2 A Digest of International Law § 217 at 409,412 (GPO
1906) (discussing the Caroline doctrine).
74 See Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use of Force at 24-25 (cited in note 73).
75 Id.
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As in the individual context, the requirements of self-defense in
the international arena were set out with a specific scenario in mind.
As codified by Article 51 of the UN Charter, one state will attack
another, and once the "armed attack" is launched-or imminent-the
attacked state can resort to its "inherent right of self-defense."76 Be-
yond recognizing that an "armed attack", is closely linked with the
definition of "aggression,"7 8 standards of self-defense are not explicitly
stated, as it is "universally acknowledged that the right of national-
defense is bounded by the same intrinsic limitations as the right of
personal self-defense."79 The traditional requirements of necessity, im-
minence, and proportionality have been reaffirmed on multiple occa-
sions in international venues.
B. Self-Defense Law and Modern Threats
Article 51(1)'s restriction of self-defense to situations of "armed
attack" was an understandable solution to the use of force witnessed
during World War II." But it did not envision the rapid proliferation of
76 UN Charter Article 51 provides an exception to Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of
force: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual ... self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." UN Charter
Art 51. See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence at 161 (cited in note 9) ("In actuality,
Article 51 has become the main pillar of the law of self-defence in all its forms, individual as well
as collective.").
77 The stringent requirement of an "armed attack" was used at the insistence of the United
States. Although the State Department's legal adviser, Green Hackworth, felt that this "greatly
qualified the right of self-defense," Governor Harold Stassen, deputy head of the delegation at
San Francisco, insisted: "[T]his was intentional and sound. We did not want exercised the right of
self-defense before an armed attack had occurred." In response to a challenge regarding U.S.
"freedom under this provision in case a fleet had started from abroad against an American re-
public, but had not yet attacked," Governor Stassen replied that "we could not under this provi-
sion attack the fleet but we could send a fleet of our own and be ready in case an attack came."
Thomas M. Franck, The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: When, If Ever, May States De-
ploy Military Force without Prior Security CouncilAuthorization?, 5 Wash U J L & Policy 51,58-
59 (2001), quoting Minutes of the Forty-Eighth Meeting (Executive Session) of the U.S. Delega-
tion, Held at San Francisco, Sunday, May 20, 1945,12 Noon.
78 As outlined in the UN Consensus Definition of Aggression (1974) Article 1(1). The
definition of "aggression" has been widely debated in its own right and is closely linked with how
one defines "self-defense." See, for example, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression, UN GAOR, 25th Sess, Supp No 19 (1970) UN Doc A/8019 47-48, IT 131-32.
79 David Rodin, War and Self-Defense 110-11 (Oxford 2002). See also Michael Walzer, Just
and Unjust Wars 58 (Basic 3d ed 2000) ("If states actually do possess rights more or less as indi-
viduals do, then it is possible to imagine a society among them more or less like the society of in-
dividuals. The comparison of international to civil order is crucial to the theory of aggression.").
80 See, for example, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), 1986 ICJ 14,94, 103; International Military Tribunal (Nur-
emberg)-Judgments and Sentences, 41 Am J Intl L 172,205 (1947) ("[Preventative action] is jus-
tified only in case of 'an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation."') (internal citations omitted).
81 Most commentators agree that UN Charter Article 51 defines and limits self-defense to
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weapons of mass destruction in a world including heavily armed
"rogue states" and terrorist organizations, thus leading to increasing
discussion of whether Article 51(1)'s restriction should be relaxed to
accommodate some form of anticipatory self-defense.
Those in favor of recognizing a right of anticipatory self-defense
point to a doctrine of customary international law predating the UN
Charter, known as the Caroline doctrine." Although usually cited in
support of relaxing the imminence requirement, the doctrine's own
terms place tight restraints on a state's ability to claim justified self-
defense. Not only did the state have to show that the "necessity of self-
defence [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation," but even if necessity was present, the de-
fending state must have done "nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."83 Although there is some
uncertainty regarding the extent to which Article 51(1) was meant to
supersede rather than incorporate existing customary law, "[w]hat can
be said with confidence is that under the Charter, as under general in-
ternational law," resort to self-defensive force is conditioned upon the
strict requirements set forth in the Caroline doctrine, which were also
"the criterion applied by the Nuremberg Tribunal." Accordingly, ac-
tions of self-defense that are more anticipatory in nature have rarely
been taken and have usually been condemned."'
In the half century since Article 51 codified states' "inherent right
to self-defense," commentators have noted that the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, along with a number of actions that fell
short of "armed attacks" but presented genuine dangers to states, have
cases of armed attack. See, for example, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, UN Doc A/35/10, 122-31 (UN 1980). But see J.L. Brierly, The
Law of Nations 417-20 (Oxford 6th ed 1963) (arguing that, taken as a whole, Article 51 was not
intended to preclude acts of self-defense against acts that did not constitute an armed attack).
82 See, for example, Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 740 (cited in note 8) ("The classic formulation
of the right of anticipatory self-defense arose from the Caroline incident."). The Caroline doc-
trine of 1838 was established in a correspondence between the American Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, and a British representative, Lord Ashburton. Infuriated that the British had de-
stroyed the U.S. ship Caroline for allegedly supplying and aiding the anti-British insurgents in
Canada, Webster demanded that the British justify their claim that their action had been in self-
defense. See Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, International Law 1152-53 (Aspen 3d ed
1999).
83 Carter and Trimble, International Law at 1152-53 (cited in note 82).
84 Brierly, The Law of Nations at 420 (cited in note 81).
85 For example, Israel's air strike against Iraqi nuclear reactors was claimed to be an act of
self-defense but was criticized on the grounds that it did not adequately meet the requirements
of necessity and imminence-in other words, that it was too "anticipatory" in nature. See Resolu-
tion 487, UN Security Coumcil, 2288th mtg (June 19, 1981), UN Doc SIRES/487, reprinted in 75
Am J Intl L 724 (1981). But see Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Re-
actor, 77 Am J Intl L 584,585-86,588 (1983).
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threatened to make Article 51 obsolete.8 The customary "norm" that a
state could legitimately use self-defense only "when an attack is so
immediate and massive as to make it absurd to demand that the target
state await the actual attack before taking defensive action" ' was in-
creasingly criticized as inadequate to address current realities."'
What might have remained a peripheral debate became concrete
after September 11, 2001 and the U.S.'s subsequent announcement of
its policy of preemptive self-defense.89 It is argued that in this changed
environment, when faced with the very real threat of rogue states and
terrorists with devastating weapons at their disposal, the "United
States and its allies may well have to rely exclusively upon their right
to anticipatory self-defense."" In an effort to delineate the legal con-
tours of such a right, several factors beyond temporality have been in-
voked "for determining whether a threat is sufficiently 'imminent' to
render the use of force necessary at a particular point."'" These fac-
tors-probability, magnitude of harm, and alternative recourses-not
only can serve as appropriate measurements of the necessity of self-
defense in the international arena, but also are apt tools to judge self-
defense in the domestic arena.
86 Franck, for example, has identified three main developments which alter the Article 51
self-defense calculus: (1) the "virtual tactical replacement of military aggression with surrogate
warfare," which is "not the kind of traditional 'armed attack' against which the 'inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense' was designed to provide protection"; (2) the "transforma-
tion of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant destruction" so that "first strike
capabilities [inevitably] begat a doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defense,' for which the literal text of
the Charter made no provision"; and (3) the development of "a new ethos [that] had begun to...
challengeo traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty." Franck, 5 Wash U J L & Policy at 57-
58 (cited in note 77).
87 Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U Chi L Rev
113,136 (1986).
88 Despite this criticism, as recently as 1996 the International Court of Justice released an
advisory opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep 226, reaffirm-
ing the traditional standards of self-defense, and indicating that Article 51 and customary inter-
national law equally demanded that the requirements of necessity and proportionality be met. Id
at 245.
89 National Security Strategy at 6 (cited in note 12) (noting that the U.S. will pursue a policy
of defense "by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders"); White
House Press Release, Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National Security Strategy (Oct
1, 2002), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html (visited
Aug 23,2004):
[S]ome threats are so potentially catastrophic-and can arrive with so little warning, by
means that are untraceable-that they cannot be contained [or deterred] .... And new
technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes "imminent." So as
a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when
necessary, before threats have fully materialized.
90 Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 575 (cited in note 8).
91 Id at 574 (calling for an approach that is "more nuanced than Secretary Webster's nine-
teenth-century formulation" in the Caroline doctrine).
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III. COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL AND
INTERNATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE
The abstract concept of justifiable self-defense can reasonably in-
clude actions that do not meet the traditional requirement of immi-
nence. If acceptance of this observation can be contemplated in the in-
ternational arena, individual self-defense law should also be reexam-
ined. Although the practical repercussions of relaxing the imminence
requirement might be different in the two contexts, the concept of
self-defense in the abstract should be consistent. The desirability of
symmetrical development can be illustrated by a comparison of inter-
national and domestic self-defense law on two levels: (1) the correla-
tion of generally applicable principles of self-defense law, and (2) an
analysis of the way in which specific anticipatory self-defense factors
could justify preemptive actions in the face of both international and
domestic violence threats.
A. Theoretical Comparison of International and Individual
Self-Defense
The law of self-defense-in any context-is the legal authoriza-
tion of the use of force to protect oneself from the unlawful aggres-
sion of another. Both domestic and international legal systems claim
a monopoly on the use of force, where self-help is reserved to the in-
dividual or state only under very specific conditions. For example,
while under U.S. domestic law it is unlawful for anyone to use force
against another except in self-defense, in the international arena UN
Article 2(4) prohibits "the threat or use of force, ', and subsequently
conditions Article 51(1)'s right of self-defense on the Security Coun-
cil's not yet having "taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security."'3 These common authorizations of self-
92 UN Charter Art 2(4).
93 Id Art 51(1). Although "the gist of self-defence is self-help," there are two points at
which self-defensive action interacts with a supervisory power: prior to the use of force through
third-party intervention; and after the use of force, when judgment is passed on its legality. Din-
stein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence at 185-86 (cited in note 9). In the area of international
law, Dinstein describes this as a two-step process. Although the first phase is left entirely "to the
unfettered discretion of the victim State" due to the lack of an "effective international police
force," the "second and final phase" requires "a competent international forum ... to review the
whole flow of events and to gauge the legality of the force employed," as was done by the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Id. This was "one of the great achievements of the UN
Charter ... [as] Article 51 enables the Security Council to undertake a review of self-defence
claims raised by Member States." Id at 186. The International Court of Justice is a second compe-
tent forum in which claims of self-defense are pled and can be judged (as in the Nicaragua case).
Id at 186-87. Just as in individuals' domestic self-defense cases, an actor "using force in self-
defence, in response to an armed attack, acts at its own discretion but also at its own risk," as the
actor's decision to use force in self-defense may be deemed illegal at a later point. Id at 187.
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defense are also circumscribed by the same requirements, as it is "uni-
versally acknowledged that the right of national defense is bounded
by the same intrinsic limitations as the right of personal self-defense,
namely, those of necessity, imminence, and proportionality."' A right
to preemptive self-defense has traditionally not been included in the
general right to self-defense in either context."
That the requirements of self-defense are the same in both arenas
is the product of the centuries-long practice of legal theorists using
domestic law to develop a coherent doctrine of self-defense in inter-
national relations law.9 As Yoram Dinstein has observed: "The legal
notion of self-defence has its roots in interpersonal relations, and has
been sanctified in domestic legal systems since time immemorial.
From the dawn of international law, writers sought to apply this con-
cept to inter-State relations.""
This conscious parallelism is justified by both principled and
practical considerations. In principle, legal systems enact moral
schemes that value life and thus set norms against aggression. To deter
aggression, or punish it post hoc, requires assigning an entity responsi-
bility for the aggression. In the international arena this necessitates
the analogy between the state and the individual. For "[i]f states actu-
ally do possess rights more or less as individuals do, then it is possible
to imagine a society among them more or less like the society of indi-
viduals."' This "comparison of international to civil order is crucial to
the theory of aggression."'
94 Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 110-11 (cited in note 79).
95 See, for example, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), 1986 ICJ 14, 103 ("[fI]n the case of individual self-defence,
the exercise of this right is subject to the state concerned having been the victim of an armed at-
tack."); Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 557 (cited in note 11):
Preemptive strikes are illegal in international law as they are illegal internally in every legal
system of the world. They are illegal because they are not based on a visible manifestation
of aggression; they are grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to be-
have in the future.
But see the dissent in Nicaragua, insisting that the case did not specifically decide the legality of
anticipatory self-defense. 1986 ICJ at 347 (Schwebel dissenting) ("The Court rightly observes
that the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not
been raised in this case, and that the Court accordingly expresses no view on that issue.").
96 See, for example, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars at 58 (cited in note 79) (explaining the so-
called "domestic analogy").
97 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence at 160 (cited in note 9). During the period
when theories of individual autonomy and responsibility were being developed, the state was
theorized in a similar manner (and by the same theorists). See Alexander Wendt, The State as
Person in International Theory, 30 Rev Intl Stud 289,305 (2004) ("Prior to the twentieth century,
many of the greatest political and social theorists of the day conceived of the state as an organ-
ism, including-in different forms-Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Spencer, and Durkheim.").
98 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars at 58.
99 Id.
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Despite this history of joint development, it has recently been
urged that states should be "freed of the notion that nations are sub-
ject to the same self-defense rules that apply to individuals," as "the
rules governing individuals under the criminal law have no obvious
application to nation-states interacting in a system of anarchy."'' ° Yet
just as individuals are treated as legally accountable entities by crimi-
nal law, states are treated as responsible entities in a variety of legal
capacities: they sign treaties, enter into trade agreements, and form
multistate organizations. If a state is in violation of any of those ar-
rangements, it can be punished through economic or diplomatic sanc-
tions, and occasionally through the use of international force."0' If a
state can be held responsible for its actions, including acts of aggres-
sion, its use of force can be limited to legitimate self-defense."" That
the legitimacy of self-defense may be calibrated differently in the in-
ternational arena than in the individual arena is to be expected, but
contextual differences are not cause for conceptual despair. Although
the different variables of self-defense may be assigned different
weights in the international arena, they remain part of the same self-
defense equation. '
100 Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 776 (cited in note 8).
101 For example, Yoo quoted Henry Kissinger as saying that "nations do not have friends,
only interests." Id at 778. In contrast, Louis Henkin explained the concept of state "sovereignty"
as consisting of norms of rights as well as responsibilities-much the way an individual's "sover-
eignty" is conceptualized. Louis Henkin, Notes from the President: The Mythology of Sovereignty,
Am Socy Intl L Newsletter 6 (Mar-May 1993). He theorized a social contract element in rela-
tions between nations that allows for intervention and accountability when a state transgresses
the accepted norms:
Like all men (and women), all states are equal in status and rights (and duties). Like indi-
viduals, states have "personhood," "will," the ability to decide and to agree. States have
rights (implying reciprocal duties). A state has the right to life, to continue to exist. It has
the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, including internal autonomy, the right to be
let alone (political independence) and a right to property (including territorial integrity). To
secure these rights states enter a social contract, agreeing to be governed by norms and in-
stitutions. These derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed.
Id.
102 Even in the Caroline correspondence, Webster explained his demand for a justification
of self-defense by asserting that "a just right of self-defense attaches always to nations as well as
to individuals, and is equally necessary for the preservation of both." Timothy Kearley, Raising
the Caroline, 17 Wis Intl L J 325,333 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
103 A self-defense calculation can be reduced to equation form, with each of the considera-
tions as a variable assigned a particular value. For example, the various requirements of self-
defense could be assigned values: I = imminence, P = probability, M = magnitude of harm, A = al-
ternative recourses, and N = necessity. If the purpose of establishing requirements of self-defense
is to limit its use to actions that are necessary (which is lessened when alternative recourses are
available), a self-defense equation could be expressed thus: I + P + M = N - A. Although differ-
ent values might be assigned to the variables depending on whether the situation to be judged
took place on the individual or international level, the equation will nonetheless remain static:
we will still be calculating the same self-defense equation. For a more thorough articulation
of this concept, see Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, Public
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Furthermore, in both contexts the argument about anticipatory
force centers on the requirement of imminence."° This requirement
"distinguishes self-defense from the illegal use of force in two tempo-
rally related ways. A preemptive strike against a feared aggressor is il-
legal force used too soon; and retaliation against a successful aggres-
sor is illegal force used too late. ' ' Thus, to prevent unnecessary re-
course to self-help, "[1]egitimate self-defense must be neither too soon
nor too late.""' This temporal component of "imminence" has been
singled out as the primary obstacle to both preemptive action by
states and the self-defense claims of some battered women. ' °
At this point, different responses to the obstacle of imminence
have evolved in each context. While in the area of domestic violence
the main tool that has been fashioned to address this issue is the bat-
tered woman syndrome, in the international context a set of criteria
has been proposed to supplement the concept of temporal imminence.
Because viewing battered women's experiences through a psychologi-
cal prism has proven inapt in assisting their self-defense claims, con-
sideration of the proposed objective factors from the international
context may be helpful in the domestic violence context. This concep-
tual project is facilitated by several parallels between the contexts: an
unresponsive and ineffective preventative legal regime, aggressors
who are undeterred by legal punishment and with whom the intended vic-
tims are familiar, and the "magnitude" of the consequences of inaction.
B. Elements of Anticipatory Self-Defense: An International and
Individual Comparison
Invigorated theories of anticipatory self-defense in the interna-
tional arena have developed much in the same way that initial theo-
ries of self-defense developed: organically. That is to say, theorists have
surveyed changes in circumstances and proposed criteria that set sen-
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 63, online at http://papers~ssrn.com/id=546104 (visited
Aug 23,2004).
104 In neither scenario has there been a serious effort to advocate for unnecessary or dis-
proportionate force. See, for example, Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 574 (cited in note 8) ("The use of
force in anticipatory self-defense must [still] be necessary and proportional to the threat.").
105 Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense at 20 (cited in note 4).
106 Id.
107 See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Ar-
ticle 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv J L & Pub Policy 539, 539 (2002) (arguing that a
proposal to attack the launch sites of any state that threatened the U.S. with nuclear or biological
weapons, while perhaps a good policy, would violate the imminence component of established in-
ternational self-defense law); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a His-
torical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am U L Rev 11, 31 (1986) (arguing
that battered women who kill in self-defense should be viewed under the rubric of excuse, rather
than justification, because "[j]ustification cannot be the proper theoretical basis for the acquittal
if there was no actual imminent unlawful deadly aggression").
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sible and acceptable parameters of behavior in light of the reality of
threats, rather than "focusing myopically on temporal imminence......
Allocation of the risk of a mistaken calculation is, of course, a political
judgment.' Simply articulating the relevant factors of probability, al-
ternative recourses, and magnitude of harm does not determine judi-
cial outcomes for particular cases. Self-defense "is a legal right, and as
with other legal rights the question whether a specific state of facts
warrants its exercise is a legal question."" ° Thus, when either an indi-
vidual or a state actor claims to have acted in justified anticipatory
self-defense, the available evidence must be assessed to determine
whether each requirement was met. Although temporal imminence
may remain a reliable indicator of whether self-defensive force is nec-
essary, its attenuation should not be fatal to a self-defense claim when
other factors-such as a high probability of the threatened aggression
coming to pass, a lack of effective alternatives, and the magnitude of
threatened harm-are present in imminence's stead.
1. Probability.
A critical factor is "the probability of an attack," which comprises
"the likelihood that this probability will increase, and therefore the
need to take advantage of a limited window of opportunity.''. This is
the "function of two factors: capability and intention..".. The probabil-
ity criterion acknowledges two important principles. First, it incorpo-
rates the intuitive point of probability, which entails some assessment
of risk based on past behavior. Past experience helps the threatened
108 Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 751 (cited in note 8). See also Glennon, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol-
icy at 540 (cited in note 107) (positing a break between the old de jure laws of self-defense in in-
ternational relations and the new de facto laws that are evolving in response to new pressures in
the "real world"); Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, NY Times A33 (Nov 21,
2002) (arguing that with the Iraq war, the U.S. was acting in response to "the breakdown of in-
ternational rules governing the use of force"); In Bush's Words: On Iraq, UN Must Face Up to Its
Founding Purpose, NY Times A10 (Sept 13,2002) (reprinting a speech in which Bush argued be-
fore the UN that "if we fail to act in the face of danger ... an emboldened regime [could] supply
[weapons of mass destruction] to terrorist allies, [and] then the attacks of Sept. 11 would be a
prelude to far greater horrors"); Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Antici-
patory Self-Defense, Weekly Standard 24 (Jan 28, 2002) (arguing that the Bush doctrine is a le-
gitimate alternative to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which, Glennon argues, has come to impair
self-defense in the international arena).
109 In the individual arena, when one says, "Preemptive self-defense cannot be allowed be-
cause we value life too much," what is being said is, "We value the potential aggressor's life too
much," so that the potential victim bears the risk of being mistaken about the threat. In the in-
ternational context, if one says, "We must be able to act preemptively because we value life too
much," what is being said is, "We value the potential victim's life too much," so that the potential
aggressor bears the risk of the victim being mistaken about a threat.
110 Black's Law Dictionary at 1390 (cited in note 10), quoting J.L. Brierly, The Law of Na-
tions 319 (Clarendon 5th ed 1955), for the definition of self-defense under international law.
111 Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 574 (cited in note 8).
112 Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 758.
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party to determine more accurately whether a threat is presented. "3
Second, in accordance with common sense, if the threat is imminent
in the sense of being permanent, the threatened party should be al-
lowed to act when presented with a "window of opportunity," rather
than allowing the aggressor to choose the exact time and manner of
confrontation.'"
4
Some critics of relaxing the requirement of imminence from
"temporal proximity" to "probability"-much like the critics of bat-
tered woman syndrome-have pointed out the increased difficulty of
distinguishing "true" claims of self-defense from actions with ulterior
motives."' If an attack is ongoing (or obviously about to be launched),
there is clear evidence that the self-defensive force is necessary. In re-
sponse, advocates of the probability approach emphasize the value of
alternative forms of evidence -that is, past experience"6 and evidence
about current intentions and capacities."7 They also consider that there
may be limited "windows of opportunity" to act on that evidence.
113 This can help to address the requirement that the "exercise of self defense must be
based on adequate proof of responsibility." Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A.
Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Milit L Rev
89,98 (1989).
114 This intuition was articulated in a recent Republican National Committee advertisement:
"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists
and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?"
Some call for us to retreat, putting our national security in the hands of others. Call Con-
gress Now. Tell them to support the President's policy of preemptive self-defense.
November 2003 Republican National Committee Advertisement (quoting President George W.
Bush), online at http://slate.msn.com/id/2091666/sidebar2091660 (visited Aug 23,2004).
115 This concern about opportunism is well founded, since, as Brierly has pointed out:
The need to keep self-defence within strict limits has been demonstrated very often in re-
cent history; for, aggressive war having been designated an international crime, nearly every
aggressive act is sought to be portrayed as an act of self-defence. The right of self-defence
was pleaded at Nuremberg and Tokyo on behalf of the German and Japanese major war
criminals and rejected by the War Crimes Tribunals.
Brierly, Law of Nations at 406 (cited in note 81). Other commentators have expressed concern
that a liberally construed standard of self-defense could serve as a mask for military adventur-
ism. See Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the
Charter System, in Antonio Cassese, ed, The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 505,
515-16 (Martinus Nijhoff 1986). This has been a strand of criticism against the U.S. action in
Iraq-that "evidentiary" claims have been substandard and ulterior motives have been at work.
See Bob Thompson, Preemptive Strike, Wash Post W12 (July 27,2003) (noting that even if Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction are found, "it's now clear that the intelligence on which we based
our attack is worthless. This is no small problem. 'If you're going to talk about preemption ...
you have to have some standard, some threshold of action.' If preemptors don't care about that,
the precedent is 'terrifying') (quoting former Foreign Service Officer John Brady Kiesling).
116 In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein's previous use of biological weapons, aggressive ac-
tions, and flagrant violation of international rules were offered as proof of future intentions. See
Robert Kagan and William Kristol, Why We Went to War, 9 Weekly Standard 6 (Oct 20,2003).
117 Again, in the case of Iraq, multiple offerings of intelligence to the international commu-
nity were made, most notably in Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the United Na-
tions. Id. A post hoc legal judgment about anticipatory self-defensive force involves a subsequent
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This proposed shift has been characterized as a move from the
rulelike standard of temporal imminence to a more flexible standard
of probability."' When behavioral parameters are set by rules, it is be-
cause it is believed that "the rule-creators ... have better information
and superior competence" to those who will "apply the rule in particu-
lar cases at a later time. ' 19 This is in contrast to the use of more flexi-
ble standards, where it is assumed that the rule-appliers will have bet-
ter information and superior competence. '2°
This argument for privileging "special knowledge" about the po-
tential attacker in the international arena is analogous to the argu-
ments advanced in the domestic violence context. As one commenta-
tor explains, "[R]esearch shows that battered women tend to become
hypersensitive to their abuser's behavior and to the signs that predict
a beating," including changes in the abuser's behavior that may indi-
cate that "this time he really was serious about carrying out his threats
to kill."''2 Not only may this "enable battered women to recognize the
imminence of an attack at a time when others without their prior ex-
perience would not," but the battered woman is also attuned to the
fact that defending herself during a beating, or trying to escape the re-
lationship, may escalate the violence, leaving her unable to defend
herself or escape during a "window of opportunity.'2 In this situation,
an approach based on the standard of probability accurately identifies
independent assessment of such evidence, and the state's reasonableness in acting on that evi-
dence.
118 See Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 758-61 (cited in note 8). "Imminence" is not a "rule" in the
way that "the speed limit is 55 mph" is a "rule." Imminence, strictly interpreted to mean "instan-
taneous or ongoing armed attack," is closer to a rule than simply saying that someone will arrive
at his destination "imminently," meaning "in the next little while." Incorporating additional axes
upon which to judge "imminence" has the effect of moving the concept away from its more rule-
like "immediate" meaning and toward accommodating the standard of "probability" (which, in
turn, can also be strictly interpreted). This assessment of probability and magnitude of harm
could look more like a cost-benefit analysis than a strict standard of imminence. In traditional
self-defense law this type of cost-benefit analysis tends to be located in assessments of "reason-
ableness." See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 Am J Comp L
683,698 (1998):
[T]he term "reasonable" functions as a place holder for a range of values that are typically
invoked to fine-tune legal rules by recognizing the peculiarities of every case. When we say
you can use only reasonable force in self-defense, we imply that a variety of individual and
social considerations can enter into a judgment that the defensive force has gone too far....
Lawyers in the common law tradition start with a single rule of reasonable force that sig-
nals all the variables of cost and benefit that the judge needs to know.
119 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L Rev 74,93 (2000).
120 See id.
121 Kit Kinports, Deconstructing the "Image" of the Battered Woman: So Much Activity, So
Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women's Self-Defense, 23 SLU Pub L Rev 155,
180 (2004).
122 Id at 180-82 (comparing battered women's plight to that of a kidnap victim seeking a
"window of opportunity" to escape or kill her kidnapper).
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the battered woman as having superior access to information than the
ex ante rulemaker.
2. Alternatives.
Even if there is a high probability of an attack, there must still be
an inquiry as to "whether diplomatic alternatives are practical.... This
phrasing emphasizes not just whether diplomatic alternatives are
available in theory (there are always more Security Council resolu-
tions, inspections, and security measures to be taken), but whether
they are likely to be effective (that is, practical). Criticism in the inter-
national arena has tended to focus on the limitations of any sort of en-




This element addresses the most controversial component of im-
minence: when can an actor "take the law into his own hands? '' 21 In
addition to pursuing procedural recourse to third parties and en-
forcement mechanisms,"' the actor must do everything he reasonably
123 Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 574 (cited in note 8).
124 This is in contrast to a possible criticism that there simply is "no international law," a
path that has been resisted. For example, in an article that advocates the evolution of interna-
tional self-defense law, Yoo first painstakingly details all of the procedural actions taken by the
U.S. prior to the anticipatory self-defensive measure, and argues that those actions in and of
themselves (without any of the anticipatory self-defense factors) legally authorized the use of
force. Id at 564-72. There is a related impulse to discount the significance in this debate of the
U.S.'s recourse to anticipatory self-defense since, it is argued, the U.S. cannot practically be held
accountable for its actions. There are both practical and theoretical problems with this move.
First, regardless of whether President Bush, or his administration, is ever tried in a criminal
court, it is plausible that the U.S. will suffer political and economic sanctions for its behavior
(some say the U.S. already is experiencing such fallout). Secondly, the existence of the law and
the law's enforcement are two separate issues. On a basic theoretical level, it is unsound to argue
that one did not behave illegally because he was not punished.
125 The primary source of the outcry against the U.S.'s "unilateral" action in Iraq was that
economic and political sanctions, weapons inspectors, and continuing international pressure were
all available-that is, anticipatory self-defense was not "necessary." This debate has been framed
as one between unilateralism and multilateralism. See Thompson, Preemptive Strike, Wash Post
at W12 (cited in note 115) (depicting the debate as between "the old school foreign policy inter-
nationalists" and "the go-it-alone, military-oriented policy makers who so decisively seized the
initiative after the [September 11 th] attacks"); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Is This a New Kind
of War? September 11 and Its Aftermath (Nov 2001), online at http://www.crimesofwar.org/
expert/paradigm-annaim.html (visited Aug 23,2004) ("The only rational and civilized thing to do
... is for the attacks of September 11, their root causes, and their consequences, to be dealt with
internationally and through the rule of law, instead of U.S. vigilante justice.").
126 It is imperative to understand that a third party's ability to intervene in the commission
of violence, while analogous, is very different from the issue of the limits of self-defense. In the
domestic violence context there has been much discussion as to what level of state intervention
in the home is desirable or necessary to deal with domestic violence. See, for example, Linda G.
Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 Harv L Rev
550 (1999); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U Pa L Rev 2151
(1995). The theoretical basis of this discussion has been debate over the public/private distinc-
tion. See generally Fineman and Mykitiuk, eds, The Public Nature of Private Violence (cited in
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can to secure himself without violence.'" The importance of this ele-
ment lies not just in a particular case, but also in its precedential value.
Procedures and rules are the great equalizers: if the U.S. can take an-
ticipatory action, how can that right be limited in others?"8
The response to these questions must be to point out what practi-
cal procedural steps were taken, and their subsequent failure. Whether
or not those steps were sufficient in any particular case does not make
the conceptual inquiry any more or less valid as a standard for judg-
ment. The outcome of this type of deliberation is a limiting factor in
and of itself. The sufficiency of the U.S.'s interaction with the UN prior
to its action against Iraq can be debated, but the resolution of that de-
bate then provides a standard against which other actions can be
judged. Furthermore, a state cannot be required to abstain entirely
from dealing with threats to its security while it attempts to address
the root causes of terrorism and rogue states-it must be a concurrent
project. This may be especially true as "terrorist groups" or rogue
note 44). The analogous discussion in international law is not about the law of self-defense, but
the debate about intervention (usually humanitarian intervention) in conflicts that threaten to
destabilize political relations through violence. See, for example, Loris Fisler Damrosch and
David J. Scheffer, eds, Law and Force in the New International Order 111-237 (Westview 1991).
The theoretical basis of this discussion has been debate over the concept of sovereignty. See
Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and Inter-
national Intervention (Johns Hopkins 1995). Both discussions engage the difficult questions of
what level and type of outside intervention is acceptable and necessary due to internal levels of
violence in family or state units that are traditionally deemed "private" or "sovereign." Although
a comparison of the two strands of discussion might be fruitful, it is far beyond the scope of this
Comment. More importantly, the ability of third-party intervenors to moderate violence, al-
though inevitably noted, is not an appropriate standard to which to hold an individual or state
actor when assessing the necessity of self-defensive action.
127 This is the equivalent of a "pre-retreat" rule applied to the international context: what
did the state do to avoid the ultimate confrontation? Options can include anything from building
a missile defense shield to installing permanently locked doors in airplane cockpits. When the fo-
cus is turned away from the actions of the potential aggressor and toward the steps that could be
taken by the potential victim to secure itself, the debate deteriorates, because there is always
something more that could be done. Furthermore, there is the related inquiry of what the U.S.
did to create the conditions that would lead another state, or terrorists, to want to attack it. See,
for example, Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military Force against Terrorist Attacks, 28
Yale J Intl L 341, 343 (2003) (suggesting that before resorting to violence, "the political objec-
tives of the terrorists and their sympathizers should be taken seriously").
128 See, for example, John Newhouse, Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Or-
der 48-49 (Knopf 2003) (noting the possible implications of the Bush doctrine as applied by
other nations in their own "hotspots," including between India and Pakistan and between the Is-
raelis and Palestinians); Colin Joyce, Japan Flexes Its Muscles; Thinking the Unthinkable, Daily
Telegraph 15 (Aug 9,2003) (reporting that by summer 2003, Japanese officials were responding
to North Korean nuclear plans by "promis[ing] pre-emptive air raids if it feels threatened," with
one official declaring that "Japan had the right to carry out pre-emptive strikes if it was clear that
the country was about to be struck by a missile"); Henry Kissinger, Beyond Baghdad, NY Post 24
(Aug 11,2002) ("It is not in the American national interest to establish preemption as a universal
principle available to every nation.").
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states "are motivated by extreme religious or political beliefs that
render them immune to diplomacy or deterrence.' '29
In the battered woman context, many of the same issues arise.
Law enforcement that is meant to provide protection has proven gen-
erally ineffective. Alternative recourses, such as enrolling batterers in
anger management programs, have thus far shown little to no suc-
cess"n Restraining orders, although sometimes effective, do not deter
batterers who are determined to harm or kill their wives or girl-
friends."' The women who escape the relationships and move to dif-
ferent states, change their names, and go into hiding have no "witness
protection" program, and many of their batterers successfully hunt
them down.'32 For the few women who kill their batterers before their
batterers kill them, an explicit acknowledgment of their lack of mean-
ingful alternatives in assessing their self-defense claims is imperative.
3. Harm.
The standard also demands an assessment of "the magnitude of
the harm that could result from the threat."'33 Specifically, "in an age of
129 Yoo, 71 U Chi L Rev at 734 (cited in note 8). Although Meessen asserts that, "[s]ociety-
induced terrorism can only be overcome by persuading terrorists to desist from causing indis-
criminate casualties," he also acknowledges that "[t]errorists, however, tend to be rather dogged."
28 Yale J Intl L at 343 (cited in note 127).
130 See National Institute of Justice, Do Batterer Intervention Programs Work? Two Studies
2 (Sept 3, 2003), online at http://www.ncjrsorg/pdffilesl/nij/200331.pdf (visited Aug 23, 2004)
("Attending the program had no effect on the incidence of physical violence."). Some of the
methodological obstacles to studying the effectiveness of batterers' programs include the fact
that "batterers drop out at high rates" and "victims often relocate or become difficult to find." Id
at ii. The latter problem refers to the fact that battered women often go into hiding, and whether
or not another "incident" occurs will depend on a batterer's success in hunting the woman down
or getting into another relationship-both difficult outcomes for the studies to track.
131 Legal declarations such as restraining orders, much like Security Counsel resolutions
and treaties, have only the force given them by those against whom they are directed. For exam-
ple, one study indicated that, of 321 domestic fatalities, 47 were suicides within homicide-suicide
incidents. See Byron Johnson, De Li, and Neil Websdale, Florida Mortality Review Project:
Executive Summary, in Legal Interventions in Family Violence: Research Findings and Policy Im-
plications 40 (National Institute of Justice July 1998), online at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles/171666.pd As many batterers kill themselves along with their intimates, they are in
some important ways analogous to "suicide bombers" and tend to be fairly unreceptive to re-
straining orders or batterer intervention programs. See also Adele Harrell and Barbara E. Smith,
Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, in Eve S. Buzawa and Carl G.
Buzawa, eds, Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? 214, 223-24 (Sage 1996) (noting that 60
percent of women in one study reported acts of abuse after the entry of a protection order, and
30 percent reported acts of severe violence).
132 See Shawn D. Haley and Ellie Braun-Haley, War on the Home Front:An Examination of
Wife Abuse 151-87 (Berghahn 2000) (describing efforts to remain in hiding, such as not opening
bank accounts or credit cards, not filing for divorce or name changes, and making multiple
moves, as well as the corresponding efforts by the batterers to locate the women, including the
enlistment of detective agencies and the harassment of family members and friends left behind).
133 Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 574 (cited in note 8).
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technologically advanced delivery systems and [weapons of mass de-
struction], international law cannot require that we ignore the poten-
tial harm represented by the threat."' 4 Critics argue that the magni-
tude of harm can be assessed in two directions: if there is mistaken in-
action, U.S. civilian lives will be lost; if there is mistaken use of force,
other countries' civilian and military lives will be lost. There must be a
choice about which party bears the risk. Even theorists who oppose
anticipatory self-defense acknowledge this dilemma. Dinstein con-
cedes, "It would be absurd to require that the defending State should
sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove
an immaculate conception of self-defence.. 3. A further consideration
might be that "the situation of a people living under the constant
threat of a recurrence of 9/11-type events falls short of survival in hu-
man dignity."'
Building upon the preceding two factors, the appropriate alloca-
tion of the risk of mistake has been described thus:
If a state has developed the capability of inflicting substantial
harm upon another, indicated explicitly or implicitly its willing-
ness or intent to do so, and to all appearances is waiting only for
the opportunity to strike, preemptive use of force is justified.
Admittedly, that line is not bright. Mistakes may be made. It is
better, however, that the price of those mistakes be paid by states
that so posture themselves than by innocent states asked pa-
tiently to await slaughter."'
The argument in the international arena relies on the devastation that
could ensue due to inaction. In the domestic violence context, it is
generally only a single woman who is killed, perhaps with her children
or other family members.'3 When the harm is assessed in the other di-
rection, however, the mistaken use of anticipatory self-defense typi-
134 Id.
135 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence at 172 (cited in note 9). For example, Din-
stein approves of Israel's actions during the Six Days War of 1967 despite noting that "notwith-
standing the well-founded contemporaneous appraisal of events-the situation may have been
less desperate than it appeared." Id at 173. He claims that the hindsight analysis is "immaterial."
Id. Once Dinstein is willing to sanction a predictive action that may actually have been incorrect,
it is hard to distinguish that situation from anticipatory force, given a heavier emphasis on degree
of proof prior to attack.
136 Meessen, 28 Yale J Intl L at 349 (cited in note 127).
137 Glermon, 25 Harv J L & Pub Policy at 552-53 (cited in note 107).
138 Note that the magnitude of violence is affected dramatically by perception. Taken as a
whole, batterers kill thousands of women and children every year, in numbers comparable to the
number of lives taken by the September 11th hijackers. See Leonard, Convicted Survivors at 8-9
(cited in note 57) (recounting estimates of women who are killed by intimates as ranging from
1,000 to 4,000 per year).
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cally results in the death of one batterer. Thus, the relative order of
magnitude is the same in both situations.'39
It also seems sensible to take some notion of "human dignity"
into account when holding a defendant responsible for allocating the
risk of future harm. Living in constant fear of being battered, possibly
to death, in order to preserve an aggressor's life denies the victim of
terror her "human dignity." It may thus be appropriate to shift the risk
to the party whose aggression has created the situation.
IV. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE FACTORS TO STATE V NORMAN
It is useful to bring the theory into dialogue with an actual case of
a battered woman denied a self-defense instruction. The majority of
battered women's cases where imminence is at issue involve contem-
poraneous confrontations; specifying what is meant by imminence in
those cases should be relatively straightforward. The true application
challenge is in the more difficult-if less frequent-cases of self-
defense in situations not objectively understood as confrontational.
Thus, it is useful to apply the above factors to a paradigmatic case in
domestic violence law of a battered woman being denied a self-
defense instruction after killing her sleeping husband: State v Nor-
man.' The controversy surrounding the case centered primarily on
the court's finding that:
[t]he evidence in this case did not tend to show that the defen-
dant reasonably believed that she was confronted by a threat of
imminent death or great bodily harm. The evidence tended to
show that no harm was "imminent" or about to happen to the de-
fendant when she shot her husband.'"'
While some decried the outcome, others concluded that the court had
avoided allowing a hard case to make bad law. For despite the "temp-
tation ... to think that the oppressed and battered woman should take
the law into her own hands," especially as "Judy Norman's appeals to
the authorities went unheeded," she still should not legitimately "put
139 This element overlaps to some extent with another requirement of self-defense law:
proportionality. It is not proposed that justifiable self-defense killings are acceptable in any situa-
tion outside of a fear of death or great bodily harm. Thus, if the feared magnitude of harm falls
short of that standard, force (whether preemptive or not) will remain illegal. See, for example,
Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57 (1961), in which a woman beat her husband to death with a baseball
bat after a period of "marital upheaval" in which he had cheated on her and refused to reconcile.
If there is no threat of death or serious bodily injury, the definition of imminence will be irrele-
vant, as the force will be "unnecessary."
140 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 9 (1989) ("we conclude that the evidence introduced in this
case would not support ... jury instructions concerning either perfect or imperfect self-defense.").
141 Id at 13.
The University of Chicago Law Review
herself in the position of judge and executioner..... But a competing
story can be told. The factors outlined above offer insight into this
situation, without requiring recourse to diagnosing Judy Norman as
suffering from the mental illness of battered woman syndrome.
Thus, by explicitly addressing the factors that informed the con-
cept of imminence in Norman and evaluating measurements of neces-
sity beyond temporality of threat, Judy's actions look less like a re-
taliatory strike or an "easy" way out of the relationship, and more like
justified anticipatory self-defense.
A. Probability
The facts of Judy Norman's case strongly supported a court's
affirmative evaluation of "the probability of an attack," including
"the likelihood that this probability will increase, and therefore the
need to take advantage of a limited window of opportunity.', 3 In the
Normans' twenty-five-year marriage, Judy suffered constant, humiliat-
ing, and physically debilitating abuse, often inflicted in days-long ses-
sions.' The threat presented by Judy's husband was very much "immi-
nent" in the sense of being "permanent": her assessment of risk based
on past experience constituted a solid basis for a finding of probabil-
ity.'
14
Furthermore, to address the probability of an "increasing" threat,
Judy offered evidence that during the last three days of her husband's
life his "anger was exhibited in an unprecedented crescendo of vio-
lence."' " He had forbidden her to eat for several days, continuously
beaten her (despite two visits from law enforcement and Judy's at-
tempted suicide), and told her that when he woke up he was taking
her to the truck stop to prostitute-an activity always accompanied by
severe beatings. As Judy testified, "I knowed when he woke up, it was
going to be the same thing, and I was scared when he took me to the
truck stop that night it was going to be worse than he had ever
been. '4 7 In light of these facts, Judy had more than adequate past ex-
142 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 11).
143 Yoo, 97 Am J Intl L at 574 (cited in note 8).
144 Judy's abuse included "frequent assaults that included slapping, punching and kicking
her, striking her with various objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at
her[,] ... putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, breaking glass against her
face and crushing food on her face." Her husband prostituted her, beating her after she "worked"
for the day; he forced her to eat her food out of dog bowls and bark, and sleep on the floor.
Norman, 378 SE2d at 10.
145 This requirement should actually be far easier to meet in the individual standard than in
the international arena, for in the international arena it is much more likely that there will be in-
telligence or national security concerns about laying out gathered evidence for public inspection.
146 Id at 19 (Martin dissenting).
147 Id at 11 (majority).
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perience to assess the need for self-defensive force and acted upon the
small window of opportunity with which she was presented.",
B. Alternatives
Much of the court's reasoning centered on the fact that Judy
Norman had options other than shooting her husband. The court
pointed out:
[Any other] result in principle could not be limited to a few cases
decided on evidence as poignant as this. The relaxed require-
ments [proposed] for self-defense ... would tend to categorically
legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands by their wives
solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their sub-
jective speculation as to the probability of future felonious as-
saults by their husbands. Homicidal self-help would then become
a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective solu-
tion, to this problem.
This argument illustrates that, regardless of what the law says, some
form of "pre-retreat" analysis takes place. It is better to address it di-
rectly, rather than through a theory of "learned helplessness" that fails
to credit the innumerable times that Judy Norman sought outside
help. Whether statutorily or through jury instructions, the inquiry must
address whether a "pre-retreat" rule is appropriate and must consider
the practicality of the alternatives."'
In Judy's case, because of her failed experiences with social ser-
vice agencies and the law, and the "inefficacy of their protection and
the strength of her husband's wrath when they failed,".'. she was con-
vinced of the impossibility of escape. Indeed, witnesses testified on her
behalf that they "believe[d] escape was impossible.'. 2 Judy had tried
to run away on multiple occasions. Each time her husband found her,
dragged her back, and severely beat her. In the final three-day escala-
148 In contrast, this line of inquiry would prove unhelpful in a number of domestic violence
situations where the abusive history is abbreviated, and the final confrontation more unexpected.
This problem would also arise in the "alternative recourse" inquiry, since out of the three to four
women that are killed every day in the United States by an intimate, many are ambushed and
killed prior to any police contact. Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justices Statistics: Intimate
Partner Violence, 1993-2001 2 (DOJ Feb 2003). This should not present a serious obstacle to a
self-defense theory, however, as it is only very rarely that the woman is able to kill the batterer
first, and thus required to stand trial.
149 Norman, 378 SE2d at 15.
150 For example, to point out that the woman had not yet enrolled her batterer in anger
management counseling would be an improper, if not offensive, factual element to import into
the conceptual standard. By all accounts, batterer programs have little to no success. See notes
130-31 and accompanying text.
151 Norman, 378 SE2d at 18 (Martin dissenting).
152 Id.
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tion period preceding his death, police had been called to their house
twice, and Judy had attempted suicide."' If we accept that the legal sys-
tem has a limited ability to protect individuals,'S, a realistic inquiry
must assess the batterer's receptivity to deterrence by the procedural
steps that are available and actually pursued. Not only were the avail-
able alternatives likely to fail, but Judy Norman nonetheless appeared
to have made good-faith attempts to utilize other avenues over the
twenty-five years of abuse before killing her husband.
C. Harm
In Judy's case, there was no question about the magnitude of
harm she would face when her husband awoke. Forced prostitution,
rape, severe beatings, and possible death were what she was prom-
ised-all forms of harm well within the traditional protections of self-
defense law. In such a situation, to "require the battered person to
await a blatant, deadly assault before she can act in defense of herself
would not only ignore unpleasant reality, but would amount to sen-
tencing her to murder by installment.' 5
CONCLUSION
As the Norman court explained, the "killing of another human
being is the most extreme recourse to our inherent right of self-
preservation and can be justified in law only by the utmost real or ap-
parent necessity brought about by the decedent."'' 6 At this point, the
best that has been done to include women's experiences in the law of
self-defense has been to offer the potential inclusion of evidence that
their actions can be explained by a syndrome. The legal system has
steadfastly refused to reconsider the traditional requirements of self-
defense. In contrast, as new threats have emerged in the international
arena, not only have there been serious discussions about the appro-
priate use of anticipatory self-defense, but the United States has
adopted just such a policy. It is "[s]hatteringly and indelibly clear...
that the losses of September 11 are real to power in a way that
women's extermination and terror by men have never been."'57
153 Id at 19 (noting that in the wake of the attempted suicide, Judy's husband attempted to
interfere with the paramedics, saying "Let the bitch die," and had to be chased back into the
house). This Comment does not advocate that attempted suicide be a prerequisite for a showing
that a battered woman had exhausted all alternatives (although the requirement could be met in
a large number of cases), but surely it sheds light on the reality that the woman had run out of
"alternative diplomatic means."
154 See notes 130-31.
155 State v Gallegos, 104 NM 247,719 P2d 1268, 1271 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
156 378 SE2d at 13.
157 Catharine A. MacKinnon, State of Emergency: Who Will Declare War on Terrorism
1780 [71:1749
2004] International Law and Battered Women's Right to Self-Defense 1781
If the factors outlined in the international arena to supplement
the requirements of self-defense when temporal imminence is attenu-
ated were implemented in cases of battered women who kill in self-
defense, assessment of their actions could be disconnected from a di-
agnosis of mental illness, addressed in a more forthright and objective
manner, and incorporated within the law of self-defense. These factors
are not exhaustive, and others might capture different aspects of do-
mestic violence. But they should trigger a more frank discussion about
what values the law of self-defense uses to measure necessity, and
challenge the fact that under the current law, some people seem to
have a more "inherent right of self-defense" than others.
against Women?, Women's Review of Books 7, 8 (March 2002). Another commentator has also
highlighted this discrepancy, proposing that countywide Departments of Home Security be cre-
ated to overhaul the currently ineffective legal system's responses to domestic violence. Mary
Becker, Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12 Wash U J L & Policy 63,93 (2003):
After identifying the involvement of many bureaucracies as a major problem in the war on
terror, the federal government responded by creating a Department of Homeland Security.
The Department has general responsibility for anti-terrorism efforts and the ability to call
on any agency for information or cooperation when appropriate. In the war on the most
common type of domestic terror, domestic violence, there is a similar need. Each county
needs to establish a Department of Home Security that is authorized to oversee the effec-
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